



Using Models to Communicate the Value of Prevention, Detection and Preparedness Before a Disease Outbreak

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Session Outline



- The importance of communication
- Example schematics to communicate disease concepts
- Example summary of factors influencing spread & control
- Example out-put from a complex model
- Example take-home message to stakeholders
- OIE take-home message today

The Importance of Communication

- Pathogens do not read papers or manuals
- Disease control guidelines must be routinely implemented to be of value
- We must encourage workers and officials to actually implement procedures
- Understanding the principles of disease spread may compel them to do so
- Various models have been developed to help understand and communicate core concepts of disease spread and control
- This presentation demonstrates some useful schematic diagrams, simple mathematical models, and out-put from a complex simulation




McNab & Dube, 2007, Simple models to assist in communicating key principles of animal disease control
Veterinaria Italiana 43:317-326

Harvey *et al* 2007 The North American animal disease spread model: A simulation model to assist in decision making in evaluating animal disease incursions *Prev. Vet. Med.* 82:176-197



Example Schematics of Disease Spread Concepts


Consider spread of a cold
if **you** and each infected person
spreads it to two new people




The “reproductive ratio” (R) = number of secondary cases generated per existing case
(in this example $R = 2$ new cases generated per existing case)

significance of $R < 1$ outbreak contracts
vs. $R > 1$ outbreak expands

Usually R Changes Between "Generations" and Cases







Hubs Can Have Great Influence




With H $R = 1.6$
Without H $R = 0.9$

(understanding “networks” is important)

Every Little Bit Helps



Every Little Bit Helps - Exponentially




Spread AND Control are “exponential” in nature

- the impact of allowing or blocking spread, goes far beyond one farm
- often not aware of “saves”.... difficult to prove value, but it is real

Schematic Representation of Spread, Detection & Response

Consider:


- Detection of FAD but not aware of other cases



Schematic Representation of Spread, Detection & Response

Consider:


- Detection
- Controlling spread from detected
- Trace forward, trace back and forward again



Earlier Detection & More Aggressive Response


Consider:

- More rapid detection
- Better tracing
- Controlling spread from detected (when fast enough)




PREVENTION, Detection, response

1) @ 2 new/case, poor detctn & rspns




aware of 1, but 62 more (and spreading)

2) @ 2 new/case, reasonable detctn & rspns




aware of 15, but 25 more (some spreading)

3) @ 1.2 new/case, poor detctn & rspns



aware of 1, but 11 more (some spreading)

4) @ 1.2 new/case, reasonable detctn & rspns




aware of 7, but 1 more (little or no spreading)

PREVENTION, Detection, response

@ 2 new / case

New	Total
1	1
2	3
4	7
8	15
16	31 *
32	63



incubation number	Total number of cases @ new cases per case		
	1.25	1.5	2
5	8	13	31 *
10	33	113	1023

earlier detection
implement controls
when fewer cases

Disease Spread AND Control are Inherently Exponential

**Collectively,
we must address the biology**


increased biosecurity barriers
increased control
decreased # new cases / case



Schematic Representation of Movement, Networks, Flow & Traceability




Good Flow Design & Extensive Knowledge



vs.

Poor Flow Design & Limited Knowledge



- 1) Network analyses of premises & movements helps anticipate & improve design.
- 2) Timely movement data within known networks, facilitates more precise response.

A Simple Model to Highlight Factors Influencing Disease Spread & Control

Factors influencing to how many people **you** “give” **your** cold, or new farms **you** infect (ie new cases generated per existing case, or **your personal R**)



d = duration available as infectious e.g. 5 days



c = contact frequency e.g. 5 contacts per day

t = transmission probability per contact e.g. 20% of contacts



s = susceptibility probability per transmission e.g. 40% susceptible

$$R = d \times c \times t \times s$$

$$R = 5 \text{ days/case} \times 5 \text{ cntct/day} \times .2 \text{ trns/cntct} \times .4 \text{ (susp) cases/trns}$$

$$R = 2 \text{ cases/case}$$

$$R = 2$$

If $R > 1$ the epidemic expands, if $R < 1$ it slows and burns out

Any combination of d , c , t , and s leading to $R < 1$ reduces spread

Example Factors Influencing Spread & Control

Duration available as infectious

- *stay home*
- early diagnosis (call veterinarian, lab diagnosis, surveillance)
- depopulation
- pre-emptive slaughter of contacts (while latent or sub-clinical)

Contact frequency

- *avoid meetings*
- avoid unnecessary livestock/equipment movements and contacts
- farm premises security
- livestock/equipment movement restrictions & quarantines



Example Factors Influencing Spread & Control



Transmission probability per contact



- *wash hands, don't shake hands / kiss at greeting*
- clean coveralls / boots
- clean and disinfect equipment
- shower-in / shower-out



Susceptibility probability per transmission

- susceptible ie not naturally immune
- susceptible ie not vaccine immune





Apparent Epidemic Curve -- includes only de



Reasons for infection -- includes all infections

Initially infected	1
Airborne*	194
Direct contact*	5
Indirect contact*	46
TOTAL	246

Actual Epidemic Curve -- includes all infectio

* In the course of a simulation run, these activities may o

Brief "taste" of NAADSM outputs illustrating disease spread & control



NAADSM - Comparison of Strategies 1000 Iterations Each



Number of Herds in Outbreak mean 95th



Caution - do not interpret the above numbers too literally
but recognize the utility of the modelling approach and
communication of the direction and potential scale of impact

Example Take Home Messages

1. **Bugs / toxins do not read or act with intent; their spread is mostly passive; mostly, they move where you buy, carry or let them ride in.**
2. **Spread and control are “exponential”; so every little bit helps and little things matter.**
3. **Decision makers (farm level to national level) need to know what and how much is at risk; “who” is contaminated with what, where and when, AND how things flow; so can prioritize, anticipate, trace and respond appropriately.**
4. **Peacetime holistic bio-security and system-design that facilitate prevention of spread, early detection, rapid aggressive investigation / tracing / response; pays exponential biological dividends (often unknown).**
5. **Industry workers, physically addressing the biology is what matters; **your** (their) routine daily actions influence **your** animal disease future far more than you may have thought.**



This is (should be) empowering to YOU

OIE Take-Home Message



1. **Disease models may be used to improve the understanding and communication of spread and control concepts.**



2. **Therefore, models may be used to compel front-line-workers and senior-policy-makers to behave routinely in a manner that truly addresses the biology of disease spread and control.**



This is (should be) empowering !!